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WILLFUL BLINDNESS AS MERE EVIDENCE 
Gregory M. Gilchrist*
          The willful blindness doctrine at criminal law is well-established 
and generally fits with moral intuitions of guilt. It also stands in direct 
tension with the first principle of American criminal law: legality. This 
Article argues that courts could largely preserve the doctrine and 
entirely avoid the legality problem with a simple shift: willful blindness 
ought to be reconceptualized as a form of evidence. 
  
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. AB, Stanford. JD, Columbia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of willful blindness—that a person can be guilty of 
knowing criminality when she is merely aware of a high risk and 
avoids knowledge of a key fact1—is both harmful and unnecessary. 
American courts have consistently embraced the doctrine even as they 
struggle to explain it.2 The result is that the version of willful blindness 
approved by most courts, including the Supreme Court, is contrary to 
fundamental principles of legality. 
It never had to be this way. This Article offers a simple 
alternative. Willful blindness has thrived because, like most 
longstanding criminal law principles, it fits basic moral intuitions. And 
like many longstanding criminal law principles, it also serves more 
efficient law enforcement. The basic idea, that a person might be guilty 
of a knowing violation upon proof of awareness of a high likelihood 
of the guilty fact plus aversion from learning that fact, resonates. The 
person who carries a package across a known drug trafficking border 
for an exorbitant fee will not be immune because he took care to avoid 
learning with certainty about the contents of the package. 
The problem with the doctrine, however, is that courts generally 
fail to explain how the willfully blind defendant could be culpable for 
a crime of knowledge. Moreover, when courts do endeavor to explain 
willful blindness, the dominant explanation amounts to boldly 
amending statutory codes by judicial fiat. In such cases, courts have 
recognized that willful blindness is something less than knowledge 
and concluded the willfully blind are equally culpable and ought to be 
punished by analogy. Few concepts are more odious to the rule of law 
than punishment by analogy,3 and yet this common and important 
doctrine of American criminal law is predicated on nothing more.4 
 
 1. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011). 
 2. Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1353 
(1992). 
 3. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 612 
(1956) (describing many vagrancy prosecutions in these terms); Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1972) (crimes defined by analogy of harm, “though long 
common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system” (footnote omitted)). Nullem 
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege. Nullem crimen sine lege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019); nulla poena sine lege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 4. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 756 (“The traditional rationale for this doctrine 
is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge.”). 
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The irony is that this problem was entirely avoidable and the 
method for avoiding the problem has been specifically identified in 
dissents to the two most significant court cases considering the 
doctrine.5 Each dissent, by Judge and later Justice Kennedy, has been 
all but ignored by courts. This Article offers reason to return to the 
mere evidence conception of willful blindness. 
It is easy to see that the doctrine elucidated by Justice Kennedy 
avoids the legality problems generally associated with willful 
blindness.6 Less obvious, but perhaps equally important, is the 
likelihood that Justice Kennedy’s conception of willful blindness 
would generate more or less the same outcomes.7 Fundamentally, this 
Article contends that willful blindness reflects the loose epistemology 
of criminal law coupled with the fact that common sense moral 
intuitions, more than any single analytic approach, undergird criminal 
law. Jurors will often punish the willfully blind, and they are likely to 
do so whether the doctrine is introduced as a substitute for knowledge 
or not. If, indeed, this is a doctrine without a difference, then there is 
no reason to hold onto it and its concomitant problems. 
The Article proceeds in seven parts. Part I introduces the doctrine 
and its problems, concluding with three possible ways of 
conceptualizing willful blindness. Part II examines the most common 
and most problematic concept of willful blindness: the substitute 
account. Part III introduces the mere evidence approach, pursuant to 
which the evidence that amounts to willful blindness permits, but does 
not demand, an inference of actual knowledge. Part IV demonstrates 
that the mere evidence conception of willful blindness fits with 
criminal law’s heuristic approach to epistemology. Part V 
demonstrates that the mere evidence account fits with the historical 
development of willful blindness. Part VI offers support for the 
contention that formally adopting and applying the mere evidence 
approach will lead to largely the same outcomes. That is, those who 
would be found guilty under a legally suspect substitution approach 
will likely also be found guilty under a mere evidence approach. This 
conclusion is, necessarily, offered as a hypothesis; only by adopting a 
mere evidence model could we conclusively know whether outcomes 
 
 5. See id. at 772 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 706 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part VI. 
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would be meaningfully affected. Recognizing this limit, the Article 
offers reason to believe the outcomes would likely not vary greatly, 
premised in the basic conception of criminal guilt as a reflection of 
moral intuition. Finally, Part VII acknowledges problems with the 
mere evidence account. 
No one can maintain that the doctrine of willful blindness is 
undertheorized.8 Shelves could be filled with the literature digging to 
great depths to place this important doctrine on firmer ground. There 
is, however, a chasm too rarely crossed between the scholarship and 
caselaw of willful blindness. This Article offers an admittedly simple 
bridge guiding courts to a spot on which this important doctrine can 
better rest. 
And the doctrine is important. Introducing his recent book on 
willful blindness, Alexander Sarch asks: “Can bad epistemic habits 
make one more culpable in ways the criminal law should recognize?”9 
As the basic tools of knowledge shift from curated and edited books, 
journals, and papers to a universally accessible and amendable set of 
ipse dixits, everyone ought to share concern about bad epistemic 
habits. People can avoid knowledge even as they appear to be seeking 
or accumulating it. Such is a terror of the internet age, and it is 
reasonable to ask how, if at all, the criminal law ought to respond. 
Additionally, ignorance has a special role within the corporate 
form.10 People complain when a corporation engages in grievous 
wrongdoing, yet no high-level officials are held accountable.11 The 
corporate form frequently renders individual prosecutions difficult.12 
Corporate hierarchies, by design, isolate functions and thus 
knowledge.13 When one considers whether a corporate executive is 
 
 8. Most recently, Alexander Sarch’s book, ALEXANDER SARCH, CRIMINALLY IGNORANT: 
WHY THE LAW PRETENDS THAT WE KNOW WHAT WE DON’T (2019), makes a significant 
contribution to the literature. Sarch offers a powerful account of willful blindness that could help 
address the accountability gap in corporate criminal prosecutions. Ultimately, as will be explored 
further below, Sarch’s theory is one that allows substitution of knowledge by something different, 
premised on comparable culpability. Rich as his approach is, absent legislative change, it does not 
avoid the legality concerns that have haunted the doctrine since its inception. 
 9. Id. at xi. 
 10. J.S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1487 (2019). 
 11. Id. at 1552 (“The very natural and immediate reaction that many observers have to 
revelations of large-scale corporate wrongdoing such as inside VW and other companies is to 
demand criminal prosecution of the top executives in charge.”). 
 12. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 335, 351 (2018). 
 13. Id. at 361–62. 
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culpable for wrongdoing that occurred on her watch, questions quickly 
turn to what she knew and when she knew it. Often, the answers will 
be that she simply did not know about the wrongdoing, but that she 
was aware of a culture or pattern of practices that, at least with the 
benefit of hindsight, led to the wrongdoing. In such cases, prosecutors 
will turn to theories of willful blindness.14 The executive may be on 
the hook for knowing culpability even absent proof that she knew.15 
Epistemic uncertainty, disregard for truth in the internet age, and 
corporate governance during a time in which corporations exert ever 
greater influence over people’s lives on a global scale demand 
attention. Each will generate calls for applying, or even bolstering, 
doctrines of willful blindness.16 To the extent these calls urge adoption 
of new statutes,17 they introduce the normative question of whether—
legality concerns aside—ignorant wrongdoing in some cases ought to 
be punished as knowing wrongdoing.18 This Article sidesteps this 
question, in part because code-wide coherent statutory change to the 
relevant laws is so very unlikely. This Article addresses what Sarch 
labels the practitioner’s problem: “Is there a sufficient legal basis for 
courts to apply the relevant imputation principle?”19 This is contrasted 
with the lawmaker’s problem: “Would it be normatively sound for the 
lawmaker . . . to adopt the relevant imputation principle?”20 
Willful blindness is being applied by the courts now. It is being 
done in a manner deeply at odds with foundational legality principles. 
The problem is likely to get worse, not better, as prosecutors face 
greater demands to pursue theories of willful blindness. Courts need 
an approach that works immediately, and this Article offers one. 
The simplicity of the approach, I believe, is its greatest benefit. 
The law, as described, defined, and applied by the courts, has never 
 
 14. Nelson, supra note 10, at 1559 (“Judge Rakoff and others have suggested that prosecutors 
could ease their burden of proving intent in these white collar cases by relying on ‘willful blindness’ 
or ‘conscious disregard.’”). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 212–30 (2019) (advocating for a new rule of motivated 
ignorance that would substitute for the mens rea of recklessness in certain cases whether the actor 
was actually unaware of the risk generated by her conduct). 
 17. Id. at 154; Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and 
the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 62. 
 18. SARCH, supra note 8, at 155 (offering a normative theory of equal culpability to support 
statutory change). 
 19. Id. at 147. 
 20. Id. 
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had great patience for nuanced epistemology. The mere evidence 
approach to willful blindness benefits from being simple, coherent, 
and consistent with moral intuitions. 
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS 
Willful blindness is particularly important because of the 
preeminence of mens rea to criminal law.21 Almost all crimes require 
mens rea, and knowledge is a particular mental state on which many 
crimes stand or fall. Was the defendant aware of a specified fact or 
result at the time she acted? If so, she acted knowingly. If not, she did 
not. 
To knowingly cause the death of another is generally punishable 
as murder;22 to do so recklessly is deemed less serious and generally 
punished as mere manslaughter.23 Knowing possession of 
contraband,24 failing to pay taxes in violation of a known legal duty,25 
laundering money known to be proceeds of illegal activity26—each of 
these crimes turns in significant part on what the defendant knew at 
the time of a particular act or omission.27 
That the criminal law relies so heavily on subjective mental states 
to define crimes is both understandable and problematic. 
Understandable, because the concept that an actor’s mental state is 
relevant to her culpability is so fundamental as to go largely 
unquestioned.28 Problematic, because few concepts stymie philosophy 
 
 21. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Note, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (“For 
hundreds of years the books have repeated with unbroken cadence that Actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea. ‘There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind,’ says Bishop. ‘It is 
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an 
offence is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist.’”); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2008) (“Intentions play a central role in our 
moral and legal discourse. As Justice Holmes famously remarked over one hundred years ago, the 
intention with which we act is fundamental to our attributions of blameworthiness. It is intention 
that distinguishes a stumble from a kick.”). 
 22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 23. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (AM. L. INST. 1980). 
 24. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
 25. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2018). 
 26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2011). 
 27. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841; 26 U.S.C. § 7201. 
 28. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009) (“It is 
characteristic of our own and all advanced legal systems that the individual’s liability to 
punishment, at any rate for serious crimes carrying severe penalties, is made by law to depend, 
among other things, on certain mental conditions.”). 
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more than cognition and the mind.29 That said, the criminal law has 
developed and continues to function in a state of contented ignorance 
as to the epistemic and ontological challenges related to the human 
mind, relying instead on a folksy psychology that, in truth, we all 
recognize even where it lacks precision or accuracy.30 
In this vein, where guilt is predicated on knowingly acting or 
causing a result, juries are instructed: 
The term “knowingly”, as used in these instructions to 
describe the alleged state of mind of [the defendant], means 
that [he][she] was conscious and aware of 
[his][her][action][omission], realized what [he][she] was 
doing or what was happening around [him][her], and did not 
[act][fail to act] because of ignorance, mistake, or accident.31 
That is, knowledge is basically described as awareness of a fact 
or set of facts.32 
A.  Why Willful Blindness? 
How can a prosecutor prove whether a defendant was actually 
aware of particular facts at some time in the past? There is no record 
of mental states. Indeed, the legal system has deftly side-stepped even 
the question of what it means to have a particular mental state—of 
what it is to be aware.33 This critical issue is taken as a given. 
Between the lack of analytic rigor defining mental states, and 
epistemic limits on our ability to study mental states, particularly past 
mental states, prosecutors necessarily rely on circumstantial evidence 
 
 29. This problem is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that contemporary philosophy of mind 
is dominated by reductionist theories that are quite difficult to reconcile with free will. This does 
not mean no one tries, but more interesting is how little anyone cares. Day to day, we believe in 
free will and likely will continue to do so, whatever philosophy of mind tells us. See Stephen J. 
Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 56 (2004) (“We have no convincing 
conceptual reason from the philosophy of mind, even when it is completely informed about the 
most recent neuroscience, to abandon our view of ourselves as creatures with causally efficacious 
mental states.”).  
 30. See id. at 51–53. 
 31. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 17:04, 
Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2020). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and 
Evidence Combined, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2577, 2579–80 (2007) (“Although classical dualism is 
now almost unanimously philosophically discredited, quite remarkably it remains the dominant 
view in the legal literature.”). 
(6) 54.2_GILCHRIST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/21  9:47 AM 
2021] WILLFUL BLINDNESS AS MERE EVIDENCE 413 
to prove mens rea.34 The defendant was a sane person who was sober 
and awake when he loaded the gun, aimed it at the victim, and pulled 
the trigger? Under these circumstances, absent some evidence to the 
contrary, common sense tells us that the defendant was aware that he 
would cause death or serious bodily injury to the victim. If death 
results, most people are comfortable concluding that the death was 
caused knowingly, and possibly purposely. 
Sometimes, however, proving knowledge circumstantially is 
difficult, or maybe impossible. The defendant invested money in a 
venture to secure a government contract in Saudi Arabia. The 
defendant was aware that the business plan included a line item of 
$400,000 described only, and opaquely, as an “agency fee.” The 
defendant was aware that agency fees are often legitimately paid to 
cover the costs of attorneys, notaries, and even line-waiters. And, there 
is a record of the defendant asking, “isn’t $400,000 high for agency 
fees on this project?” and not following up when the response was, 
“don’t worry about how things are done in Saudi Arabia.” When it 
turns out that $380,000 of that line item traveled through third parties 
to bribe a foreign official to secure the contract, would we say the 
defendant knew such bribe would occur? Plainly he was not actually 
aware of the particular bribe to the particular official; he was insulated 
from those facts. However, he was plainly aware of a risk that 
something like this would occur. In this case, can the investor be said 
to be an accomplice to the knowing bribery of a foreign official? 
Cases like this call for application of the doctrine of willful 
blindness, or deliberate ignorance. This doctrine allows prosecutors to 
establish guilty knowledge by proving something other than actual 
awareness.35 In most jurisdictions, where proof of guilt requires 
knowledge of X, the judge can instruct the jury it may convict if the 
prosecution proves (1) that the defendant was aware of a high 
probability that X; (2) that the defendant consciously took deliberate 
actions not to learn X; and (3) that the defendant did not actually 
 
 34. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging 
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2010) 
(“Because we cannot presently read someone’s mind to determine her mens rea at the time of the 
crime, the jury is often told it can rely on the objective circumstances surrounding the criminal’s 
conduct to draw inferences about her state of mind.”). 
 35. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353 (“Wilful ignorance is employed in criminal law primarily, 
and most controversially, as a mental state that satisfies a required mens rea of knowledge.”). 
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believe X was untrue.36 That is, the judge can instruct the jury that guilt 
requires knowledge of X, and then instruct the jury that it may convict 
without finding knowledge of X.37 
People who pay bribes for foreign officials are blameworthy. 
People who invest money knowing it will be used to pay bribes to 
foreign officials are comparably blameworthy. The investor who 
recognized the risk of bribes, who expressed concern about an 
exorbitant agency fee, and who accepted as comfort the admonition 
not to worry about how things are done in another country seems 
comparably blameworthy. Yet, the last of these is different than the 
first two; she may not have actual awareness that the money will be 
used to pay bribes. 
In the bribery hypothetical, the facts would support the 
conclusion that the defendant invested with an awareness of a high 
probability that the project involved paying bribes. Moreover, the 
investor’s failure to inquire further upon receiving such a patently 
unsatisfactory answer to his reasonable question may be her conscious 
avoidance of the issue because she did not want to know. In such a 
case, most courts would issue a willful blindness instruction, allowing 
the jury to convict based on this proof of less than knowledge.38 
“The doctrine of willful blindness is well established.”39 The 
basis for and nature of the doctrine, however, remains, at best, 
muddled, and the majority conception of willful blindness represents 
an affront to basic legality principles.40 Exactly how this court-made 
doctrine functions is rarely clear. One possibility, the prevailing one, 
 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 37. See id. (approving the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction on the willful blindness). 
 38. As described by the Ninth Circuit: 
When knowledge is at issue in a criminal case, the court must first determine whether 
the evidence of defendant’s mental state, if viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, will support a finding of actual knowledge. If so, the court must instruct the 
jury on this theory. Actual knowledge, of course, is inconsistent with willful blindness. 
The deliberate ignorance instruction only comes into play, therefore, if the jury rejects 
the government’s case as to actual knowledge. In deciding whether to give a willful 
blindness instruction, in addition to an actual knowledge instruction, the district court 
must determine whether the jury could rationally find willful blindness even though it 
has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge. If so, the court may also 
give a [willful blindness] instruction. 
Id. at 922. 
 39. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011); see infra Part V. 
 40. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353 (“[D]espite the use of wilful ignorance as a criminal mens 
rea for over 100 years, there is tremendous confusion in this area of law and a lurking sense that 
something is fundamentally awry.”). 
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is that willful blindness represents a mental state distinct from 
knowledge, but equally culpable.41 Accordingly, the defendant who 
holds this mental state ought to be punished the same as the defendant 
who actually knew. Returning to the bribery example, were there 
another investor with the exact same circumstances, but who was told, 
“we need the money to bribe the official” in response to her reasonable 
inquiry about high agency fees, would we blame her more? Do we 
really blame the intentionally ignorant investor less because he 
avoided ever reaching actual awareness of the ultimate and critical 
fact? 
This account, however, generates two fundamental problems. 
First, under this account willful blindness permits punishment by 
analogy. Second, it stems from courts crafting common law crimes. 
As such, this account of willful blindness is at odds with foundational 
legality principles.42 These criticisms are not new, but they have not 
limited dominance of the willful blindness doctrine. 
This Article offers an alternative. Rather than conceiving of 
willful blindness as distinct basis for convicting a defendant of a 
knowing violation, courts ought to construe willful blindness as mere 
evidence of knowledge. The facts of willful blindness come up often. 
And, they often suggest culpability equal to that of one who acts with 
actual knowledge. However, they also sometimes suggest something 
more: actual knowledge. 
Knowledge, like any subjective mental state, is difficult to prove 
by direct evidence. Fact-finders are necessarily called upon to 
extrapolate from certain evidence whether a defendant had a particular 
mindset or not. Willful blindness is simply a condition from which 
jurors could infer actual knowledge. The condition described by 
willful blindness occurs with sufficient frequency that it has been 
recognized and named, but ought to be understood as nothing more 
than circumstantial evidence from which one might infer knowledge. 
Understood as mere evidence, willful blindness avoids the legality 
 
 41. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 766. 
 42. Willful blindness is not uniquely problematic in this regard. For example, the doctrine of 
voluntary intoxication, pursuant to which mens rea that is not present may, under certain 
circumstances, be imputed to one who lacks the mens rea by reason of her intoxication suffers from 
very similar legality problems. Likewise, entire substantive areas of law, like fraud, are so poorly 
defined as to render the concept of notice farcical. A better conception of willful blindness will, of 
course, do nothing to improve or remedy other failings of the American legal system. Hopefully, 
that is not reason to abandon the effort. But see SARCH, supra note 8, at 161. 
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problems generally associated with the doctrine, while maintaining 
relative adherence to intuitions about equal culpability that led to its 
creation. Moreover, the mere evidence account of willful blindness is 
a better fit historically, philosophically, and functionally, than the 
alternatives. 
Anthony Kennedy wrote dissents in two seminal willful blindness 
cases. First, as a judge, he dissented from United States v. Jewell,43 an 
en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that willful blindness 
constitutes a mental state distinct from knowledge that may 
nonetheless be sufficient to establish a knowing violation.44 Then-
Judge Kennedy maintained that “[w]hen a statute specifically requires 
knowledge as an element of a crime . . . the substitution of some other 
state of mind cannot be justified even if the court deems that both are 
equally blameworthy.”45 Thirty-five years later, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court described willful blindness as a well-established 
acceptable substitute for knowledge in criminal cases,46 Justice 
Kennedy did not waiver. Dissenting alone, he maintained that a 
distinctive mental state cannot be a substitute for knowledge; it may, 
however, be evidence of knowledge.47 
No court has ever accepted Justice Kennedy’s position, and it has 
received scant scholarly attention. This is surprising because he seems 
to have the better argument as a matter of theory, but also because the 
cost of adopting a mere evidence view of willful blindness is low, 
while the benefit of avoiding the basic legality problems is significant. 
Only by conceptualizing willful blindness as mere evidence can the 
legality problems be avoided. At the same time, doing so is unlikely 
to lead to significantly different results in individual cases: where the 
facts of willful blindness are compelling, knowledge will often be 
presumed anyway. As a substitute for knowledge, willful blindness is 
something of a black eye to criminal justice; this Article suggests it 
could just as easily be avoided, and therefore ought to be. 
 
 43. 532 F.2d 697, 708 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 44. Id. at 704 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 706. 
 46. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 766. 
 47. Id. at 774 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Facts that support willful blindness are often 
probative of actual knowledge.”). 
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B.  Three Conceptions of Willful Blindness 
Courts have not spent much time fussing over the analytic clarity 
of the willful blindness doctrine; scholars have. Douglas Husak and 
Craig Callender identified two different conceptions of willful 
blindness variously offered by courts and commentators.48 First, under 
the “actual knowledge account,” willful blindness is described as a 
form of actual knowledge.49 Alternatively, under the “substitute 
account,” willful blindness is described as a substitute for knowledge, 
which itself is lacking.50 The latter introduces a distinct mental state 
that can suffice for knowledge; the former defines knowledge to 
include the conditions of willful blindness. 
Too often this distinction is ignored: “Confusion about whether 
the wilfully ignorant defendant possesses genuine knowledge or a 
substitute for knowledge infects many of the hypotheticals and real 
cases commentators use to illustrate the phenomenon. This confusion 
is intolerable. An adequate understanding of wilful ignorance requires 
commitment to one view or the other.”51 The confusion is intolerable, 
but it is also understandable. Indeed, the Model Penal Code (the 
“Code”) contributes to the confusion. 
The Code provides that “[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a 
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is 
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence.”52 
By defining knowledge to include a condition generally associated 
with willful blindness, the Code seems to adopt the actual knowledge 
approach, thus eliminating some of the legality problems. The 
commentary specifies that this provision is meant to capture willful 
blindness.53 Under this approach, substantive crimes that require a 
 
 48. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 42. 
 49. Id. (“According to this interpretation, wilful ignorance is a species of genuine knowledge; 
thus the wilfully ignorant defendant does possess genuine knowledge after all.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 50. Id. (“According to this interpretation, wilful ignorance is not a species of genuine 
knowledge; although the wilfully ignorant defendant does not possess genuine knowledge, there is 
a reason to treat him as though he did.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 51. Id. at 43–44. 
 52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 53. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 9 (“Subsection (7) deals with the situation that British commentators have 
denominated ‘wilful blindness’ or ‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable 
existence of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not exist.”). 
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knowing violation are, in more traditional parlance, really requiring a 
violation committed with actual awareness or willful blindness.54 
Yet, does the Code’s definition really capture willful blindness? 
The commentary convolutes the issue with this statement: “The 
inference of ‘knowledge’ of an existing fact is usually drawn from 
proof of notice of high probability of its existence, unless the 
defendant establishes an honest, contrary belief.”55 By referring to an 
inference of knowledge from proof of awareness of a high probability, 
the Code evokes the mere evidence approach advocated by this 
Article. But that is at odds with the Code’s definitional approach 
which would mandate a finding of knowledge, not merely allow its 
inference, upon a showing of awareness of a high probability.56 Even 
under the Code, confusion about the very nature and function of 
willful blindness remains.57 
Moreover, if the Code taking a pure definitional approach, and 
defining knowledge as traditional knowledge or willful blindness, it 
fails to properly capture willful blindness in the definition. Generally, 
although not always, willful blindness requires more than an 
awareness of a high probability; it also requires an active effort to 
avoid learning the truth of the matter.58 The Code omits that. 
Husak and Callender were right: there remains far too much 
confusion between the actual knowledge and the substitute accounts 
of willful blindness.59 There is, however, a third account: the method 
of proof account. Considered as a method of proof, willful blindness 
is neither a substitute for, nor a form of, knowledge; rather, willful 
blindness is a set of relatively common conditions from which a 
factfinder might infer actual knowledge.60 This is not itself a novel 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. § 2.02(7). 
 57. Some of the confusion likely stems from the imprecision of “high probability.” The 
commentary explains that this language was adopted following concerns that the previously 
proposed “substantial probability” left too little gap between knowledge and recklessness. Id. 
§ 2.02 n.42. However, this clarification only highlights that under the Code the distinction between 
recklessness and knowledge may be merely degree of certainty. 
 58. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (“While the Courts 
of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree 
on two basic requirements: (1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high 
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of 
that fact.”). 
 59. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 43–44. 
 60. See Charlow, supra note 2,  at 1388. 
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idea. Indeed, this is the very claim made deep in the commentary to 
the Code (albeit perhaps unintentionally).61 And, it is that urged by 
Justice Kennedy.62 It is, however, definitely not the prevailing 
account. 
The evidentiary account is generally disclaimed as different than 
willful blindness.63 Courts have come to understand willful blindness 
not merely as a method of proof, but rather as an alternative mental 
state that can itself satisfy the statutory requirement of knowledge.64 
By and large, courts have embraced the substitute approach.65 
II.  THE SUBSTITUTE ACCOUNT IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC AND 
MOST WIDELY ACCEPTED ACCOUNT OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS 
One might fairly question whether this distinction has teeth: does 
it really make a difference whether we understand willful blindness as 
a substitute for actual knowledge, a form of actual knowledge, or as a 
method of proving actual knowledge? It does. 
The substitute approach instructs juries that there is an alternative 
basis—other than knowledge—on which the defendant can be 
convicted.66 Indeed, one of the clearer and less problematic model 
instructions on willful blindness directs jurors that “the government 
may prove that [the defendant] knew of that fact or circumstance if the 
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] 
deliberately closed (his) (her) eyes to what would otherwise have been 
obvious to (him) (her).”67 It continues: 
 
 61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9. 
 62. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 774 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Facts that 
support willful blindness are often probative of actual knowledge.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 101 n.7 
(2017) (“The willful ignorance doctrine should not be confused with the distinct evidentiary rule 
that evidence of willful ignorance can also constitute evidence from which a jury may infer actual 
knowledge.”). 
 64. Id. at 101. 
 65. Id. at 101 n.7. 
 66. And this is how most courts conceptualize willful blindness, as an accepted substitute for 
knowledge that the government may elect to prove in place of actual knowledge. See, e.g., United 
States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Generally, in criminal prosecutions, the 
government elects to establish a defendant’s guilty knowledge by either of two different means. 
The government may show that a defendant actually was aware of a particular fact or circumstance, 
or that the defendant knew of a high probability that a fact or circumstance existed and deliberately 
sought to avoid confirming that suspicion.”). 
 67. See COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THIRD CIR., MODEL CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 21 (2018), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-civil-jury-table-contents-
and-instructions. 
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You must find that [the defendant] (himself) (herself) 
[actually,] subjectively believed there was a high probability 
of the existence of (state the fact or circumstance, knowledge 
of which is required for the offense charged), consciously 
took deliberate actions to avoid learning [used deliberate 
efforts to avoid knowing] about it, and did not actually 
believe that it did not exist.68 
On this instruction, a juror would likely conclude that the 
knowledge element of the offense is established by proof that: 
1. the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact 
in question; 
2. the defendant took deliberate action to avoid learning 
more about that fact; and 
3. the defendant did not hold an actual belief the fact did not 
exist.69 
As a substitute account, these conditions precedent appear, by 
themselves, to be sufficient to establish knowledge. As such, the 
substitute account expands the set of conditions that establish 
knowledge; it actually expands the definition of knowledge as the term 
used in statutes. This expansion introduces most, though not all, of the 
controversy surrounding willful blindness. 
A.  Willful Blindness and Legality 
There are three primary problems associated with willful 
blindness. First, judicial usurpation of the legislative function: when a 
judicially crafted doctrine expands the scope of liability, the judiciary 
has effectively legislated.70 
Willful blindness is a common law doctrine by which courts 
allow conviction for a knowing violation based on something other 
than knowledge. Conviction by judicial caveat is a problem. Crimes 
 
 68. Id. at 22. 
 69. This Third Circuit model instruction does contain language consistent with the method of 
proof approach advocated by this Article. In other parts of the instruction, the jurors would be told 
that they “may find” knowledge based on such evidence. Id. at 21. The permissive language is 
consistent with the method of proof approach. At best, however, this instruction is ambiguous 
between the approaches, and, because it concludes with language lacking the permissive modifier, 
see supra text accompanying note 8, it seems to favor the substitute approach. 
 70. Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 194–95 (1990) (“[I]f the judiciary substitutes a lesser mental 
state for statutorily prescribed knowledge, then it encroaches on the legislative prerogative of 
defining criminal conduct.”). 
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must be publicly defined ex ante, and there can be no punishment 
absent law. This is a first principle of legality, an axiom on which the 
rule of law is built.71 In the United States, this principal generally 
means that an act cannot be punished absent a statute forbidding it. 
There ought to be no common law of crime,72 because incremental 
rule development predicated on specific cases and controversies 
would necessarily entail—at certain points in history—punishment of 
acts not publicly defined ex ante.73 Any punishment stemming from a 
case that advanced the common law would be punishment based on 
law not defined ex ante. 
Robin Charlow argues that this is not actually a problem because 
“‘knowledge’ is an ambiguous term, not having one fixed or limited 
meaning . . . thus rendering the term open to judicial construction.”74 
As a legal term, “knowledge” is indeed ambiguous.75 Therefore, courts 
must construct its meaning in order to instruct juries to apply the term. 
Yet, when courts conceive of “willful blindness” as something distinct 
from and substitutable for “knowledge,” they are not constructing; 
 
 71. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 335, 337 (2005) (“The doctrines that make up the ‘legality principle’ include the modern 
abolition of common law penal doctrines, the modern prohibition of the judicial creation of penal 
rules, special rules for the construction of penal statutes, the constitutional prohibition of ex post 
facto penal laws, the due process bar of retroactive application of criminal rules, and the due process 
invalidation of vague criminal statutes.”). 
 72. Rhode Island maintains a code provision allowing for punishment of common law offenses 
not otherwise codified. “The possibility of significant punishment (here, up to five years’ 
incarceration) for an uncodified (indeed, unenacted) crime severely undercuts the usefulness of 
having a criminal code at all.” Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American 
Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2000). 
 73. Of course, in the United Kingdom and United States there is a long and continuing 
tradition of common law crimes. The theft crimes have always been almost necessarily subject to 
common law definition, if only because “[t]he field of theft offenses displays a variety as rich as 
the imagination of those who seek dishonest gain.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
LAW 3 (1978); see also Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011) 
(“If one attempts to key one’s definition of fraud to descriptions of behaviors, new behaviors will 
inevitably be invented, or will simply arise, that expose the definition as faulty and 
underinclusive.”). But it’s not just theft; most crimes were developed at common law. Moreover, 
although today, in the United States, most states expressly forbid punishment based on a crime not 
defined by statute, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.03 (LexisNexis 2021) (“No conduct 
constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised 
Code.”), the line between statutory interpretation and common law development is blurry. Courts 
continue to develop something that is probably most accurately described as the criminal common 
law. Or, as Dan Kahan describes it, “[F]ederal criminal law, as a whole, is best conceptualized as 
a regime of delegated common law-making.” Daniel M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal 
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996). 
 74. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1355 n.11. 
 75. See infra Part III. 
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they are legislating. If knowledge is defined to include willful 
blindness, or if willful blindness is accepted as a form of 
circumstantial evidence from which knowledge can be inferred, this 
problem is averted. However, so long as the substitute account 
dominates, this remains a real problem. 
Second, punishment by analogy: the core justification courts give 
for adopting willful blindness as a substitute for knowledge is that a 
person who is willfully blind is equally culpable as one who actually 
knows. There are few graver offenses against basic legality principles 
than allowing the moral calculus of judges to substitute for ex ante 
promulgation of rules.76 Alexander Sarch argues, to the contrary, that 
where a fact (e.g., willful blindness) is equally helpful to explaining 
why an action should be punished as another fact (e.g., knowledge), 
the former is an acceptable substitute for the latter.77 He also makes a 
compelling case that willful blindness makes the same contribution to 
explaining why acting under that mental state is criminalized as 
knowledge, thus satisfying his condition.78 However, this necessary 
step in the equation is itself the problem of punishment by analogy.79 
Perhaps acting with willful ignorance of a particular fact is equally as 
wrong as acting with knowledge of that fact,80 but if willful blindness 
is understood as something distinct from knowledge, that is immaterial 
to the legality question. If the statute criminalizes the knowing action, 
then only knowing action will suffice.81 To engage in the moral 
 
 76. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820) (“It would be dangerous, indeed, to 
carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its 
provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, 
or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated.”). 
 77. Sarch argues: 
[I]f mental state M is required for crime C because the presence of M makes a particular 
kind of contribution to explaining why the conduct designated by C is criminalized in 
the first place, then if another mental state, M*, makes exactly that same contribution (or 
a greater contribution of the same kind) to explaining why that conduct is criminalized, 
then M* should be allowed to substitute for M. 
Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, supra note 63, at 134–35 (emphasis omitted). 
 78. Id. at 135. 
 79. Sarch argues to expand the analogy to punish merely reckless ignorance in some cases. 
“[T]aking the traditional rationale [for punishing willful ignorance] seriously requires us to also 
allow some forms of egregious non-willful ignorance—most importantly, reckless ignorance—to 
substitute for knowledge in conditions of equal culpability.” Id. at 110. 
 80. And this is the position taken by courts justifying the doctrine. See, e.g., Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 
 81. The solution, of course, would be to amend the statute to forbid willfully blind conduct. 
This Article proceeds from the premise that this solution, however appealing, will not happen. See 
supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
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calculus required to justify punishing something distinct from 
knowledge is to punish by analogy. Legislatures are free to adopt such 
reasoning ex ante, judges may not ex post.82 
Finally, willful blindness generates some concern that defendants 
may be erroneously convicted for mere recklessness or negligence.83 
The substitute account is responsible for the first two problems, but 
not the third. Shifting away from the substitute account of willful 
blindness will eliminate core legality concerns, although it will not 
completely eliminate concerns about wrongful convictions 
surrounding willful blindness cases.84 
B.  Statutory Solutions 
There remains one suggestion so sound that it would seem to 
carry the day. If we mean to punish the willfully blind as we punish 
the knowing, let us simply amend the statutes to punish knowing or 
willfully blind behavior.85 There is hardly any analytic objection to 
this alternative. One may object that the expansion of criminal liability 
is itself problematic.86 Fine, but that is a different issue. If we accept 
that moral intuition supports punishing the willfully blind, and that the 
willfully blind ought to be punished, amending codes to punish this 
mental state would avoid all legality concerns. Model Penal Code 
section 2.02 could be amended to include a new subsection between 
its definitions of “knowingly” and “recklessly.”87 Each statute 
punishing knowing conduct could be amended to either include, or 
 
 82. Sarch acknowledges that only statutory reform can completely respond to these legality 
concerns if a robust, substitute version of willful blindness is to be retained. See SARCH, supra note 
8, at 154–55. 
 83. See, e.g., Harry L. Clark & Jonathan W. Ware, Limits on International Business in the 
Petroleum Sector: CFIUS Investment Screening, Economic Sanctions, Anti-Bribery Rules, and 
Other Measures, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 75, 115 (2011) (arguing that given the lack of 
clarity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act context, “in practice, the DOJ often seems to be guided 
by what is essentially the lower negligence standard”). 
 84. It may, however, provide a better perspective about these concerns. Willful blindness cases 
are really cases where the evidence of a core issue is limited. But when a core issue in a case is a 
person’s mental state at some time in the past, the evidence is always and necessarily limited. 
Willful blindness is a type of evidence—like contemporaneous recordings, surrounding 
circumstances, common sense inferences—from which a juror can make reasonable conclusions 
about a person’s mental state at particular time in the past. Judgments in willful blindness may be 
mistaken, but so too they could be mistaken in cases relying on more traditional evidence of mental 
state. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 774. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 85. See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 68–69. 
 86. Sarch argues that expanding criminal liability to cover systemic ignorance is normatively 
and instrumentally desirable. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 175–76. 
 87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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exclude, willfully blind conduct. Or, Code definitions of knowledge 
could be amended to capture the disjunctive set of traditional 
knowledge or willful blindness. If the law seeks to punish willfully 
blind conduct as knowing conduct, then the positive law ought to say 
as much. Then, everyone would be on notice, the legislature, not the 
judiciary, would be defining the crime, and there would be little basis 
for complaint. 
Sadly, this solution is as unlikely as it is perfect. Our legal system 
is comprised of (at least) fifty-one discrete systems, each with its own 
code. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code is often 
heralded as a singular success in advancing our criminal codes, and 
yet, even for that remarkable success, the codes of each state remain 
as different as they are similar.88 The prospect of a uniform and 
complete statutory fix to the problem of willful blindness is thus 
bleak.89 Courts created this doctrine, and courts are best situated to 
improve it. 
III.  THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT ALLOWS ACCOUNTABILITY 
WITHOUT LEGALITY PROBLEMS 
Recognizing willful blindness merely as a method of proof 
empowers the jury to convict for actual knowledge based on proof of 
willful blindness, but it prevents conviction for mere willful blindness. 
The method of proof approach requires an additional cognitive leap: 
to convict for a knowing violation based on willful blindness, jurors 
would need to consider the facts of willful blindness in context and 
conclude that the defendant “actually knew.” In this way, accepting 
willful blindness as merely a form of evidence is superior to defining 
knowledge to include willful blindness. While the definitional shift 
would remedy the core legality problems in the substitute approach, it 
would also necessarily broaden the scope of criminalized conduct, at 
least marginally. Absent a showing that more expansive 
 
 88. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
5 (8th ed. 2019). 
 89. For more on the difficulty of code reform, see Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst 
(and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, supra note 72, at 2 (“But the virtues of codification are 
not always, or even usually, central to legislatures when they address these issues. No politician 
runs for office on a platform to ‘increase internal consistency within the criminal law.’ Thus, while 
criminal law attracts much legislative attention, criminal codes attract little. As a result, the 
advantages of codification commonly are realized only imperfectly in American codes.”). 
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criminalization is desirable,90 the better course would be to maintain 
knowing violations as just that and allow juries to assess whether and 
when the circumstances of willful blindness are sufficient to infer 
knowledge. 
Glanville Williams seems to have anticipated the method of proof 
approach in a hypothetical: 
An example of willful blindness in the proper sense is where 
an employer knew that his business was being run in an 
illegal way, and absented himself without having altered the 
arrangements; he was held to “know” that the law was being 
broken in his absence even though he had no direct 
information about what was happening then.91 
This particular example, however, has generated some criticism: “Ex 
hypothesi, the employer ‘knew that his business was being run in an 
illegal way.’ About what proposition, then, is he alleged to be wilfully 
ignorant?”92 
The query is fair, and plainly teed up by a hypothetical that posits 
knowledge in an effort to establish knowledge. But the answer is also 
clear: the employer was willfully ignorant as to the actual facts of 
criminal conduct. For example, the tavern owner might be aware that 
illegal gambling occurs on the premises in his absence, yet he might 
have no actual information about who gambles, how much, in which 
room, on what game, and at what time. In that case, he is willfully 
ignorant of the acts constituting the offense, even if he actually knows 
that gambling is occurring. Moreover, he has a motive to not expand 
on this general knowledge: he benefits from the gambling by selling 
 
 90. Indeed, this is Sarch’s argument: “Given the pressing worries about over-criminalization 
that other scholars have raised, one might wonder whether we really need yet another tool by which 
to secure more criminal convictions. I argue that, despite these worries, my proposed expansion is 
especially important in the white-collar context.” Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, supra note 63, 
at 103. As I have argued elsewhere, efforts to expand criminal prosecutions of individuals in the 
corporate context are generally misguided if understandable. Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 335. 
Sarch’s substantive proposal differs from the procedural efforts I argued against; he urges 
expanding the scope of what constitutes criminal conduct in the corporate sphere. Accordingly, he 
avoids my objection that the burden of prosecutions would fall mostly on lower level employees. 
However, my concern about tension with the rule of law remains given the inherent vagueness of 
many white-collar criminal laws. Moreover, I worry that an expansion of criminal exposure such 
as that envisioned by Sarch would create such a significant chilling effect on socially desirable risk-
taking in the corporate context that its full effects are difficult to imagine. Sarch’s suggestion, 
however, is compelling, and a full discussion of its impacts and merits is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 91. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 125 (2d ed. 1984). 
 92. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 43 n.58. 
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more drinks from added traffic, and he seeks to evade culpability by 
avoiding more specific knowledge. The fact of his knowledge is the 
ultimate question in a contested case; the function of willful blindness 
is to introduce a circumstantial means of proving knowledge based on 
other facts. 
There is almost never93 direct evidence of the relevant knowledge 
(i.e., that the employer knew his business was being run in an illegal 
way).94 In many hypotheticals, such as that offered by Williams about 
an employer who “knew” about illegal conduct in his business, the 
description concentrates on the fact of knowledge. As such, the 
hypothetical aims to inform us about the defendant’s subjective mental 
state at a particular time. The law presumes that there is a definite 
answer to this question whether or not we have epistemic access to it. 
In practice, however, the contentious issue is what set of facts, 
established by a prosecutor, will permit a jury to find knowledge. 
There is no direct evidence of a mental state, particularly one in the 
past. Accordingly, knowledge, like all other mental states, can only be 
proven circumstantially.95 The jury will be asked to extrapolate from 
demonstrable facts to reach a conclusion about the defendant’s mental 
state at a past point in time. Direct evidence will be about other facts—
for example, that revenues were always higher when a particular 
employee worked, that the increased revenues centered on a back bar 
in a private room, and that the employee had a history of running 
games. A prosecutor might introduce proof of each of these facts, and 
 
 93. Exceptions may include confessions and contemporaneous documentation of the 
defendant’s mental state (although even these are subject to error and as such are at least one step 
removed from a type of truly direct evidence that never exists for mental states). Samuel W. Buell 
& Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing, 75 DUKE L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 133, 153. 
 94. As Justice Kennedy has observed: 
Circumstantial facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any event, for 
the jury lacks direct access to the defendant’s mind. The jury must often infer knowledge 
from conduct, and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such 
inference, as where an accused inducer avoids further confirming what he already 
believes with good reason to be true. 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 774 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 95. There is considerable reason for skepticism about any clear line between direct evidence 
and circumstantial evidence. Indeed, there may be reason to question whether direct evidence does 
or could ever exist. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2009). With past mental states, skepticism about direct evidence is 
stark. Some evidence is more direct than others, but even a video record of the defendant describing 
his awareness of facts at a point in time require some deductions or inferences before a conclusion 
about his state of mind can be reached. 
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no other proof that the employer knew his business was hosting illegal 
gaming. Posit that the objective truth of the matter is that the employer 
did know his business was hosting illegal gaming (as in Williams’ 
hypothetical), but the question remains open as to whether that 
knowledge can be proven based on the available evidence. Willful 
blindness as a method of proof is merely the common-sense 
recognition that actual knowledge can be established by this particular 
kind of circumstantial evidence. 
Some will object to limiting willful blindness to mere evidence 
(as opposed to an extension of, or substitute for, actual knowledge) on 
the basis that it is too limited: demonstrably culpable defendants will 
be acquitted. There are, of course, two responses to this objection. 
First, fundamental legality principles necessarily trump expediency or 
appeals to a vague principle of justice; otherwise, we will have shifted 
our discussion from law to mere power.96 That a person deserves to be 
convicted, absent reference to public law, is simply not an argument 
the law can recognize.97 Second, however, is a more pragmatic reply. 
While the mere evidence approach avoids the legality problems that 
accompany the substitute approach, it is less clear how many 
outcomes would actually differ. One of the conceptual problems with 
all willful blindness hypotheticals is that in the omniscient 
presentation of the facts, the scenarios offer a truth-certain about the 
defendant’s ultimate knowledge. 
In reality, there may or may not be such a truth-certain,98 but trials 
lack an epistemic method to ascertain it in any event. Trials operate 
through evidence, which is necessarily akin to shadows on the wall of 
Plato’s cave. In court, there is much talk of truth, but access to 
objective truth is at best indirect: there is evidence, and there are 
permissible inferences to be made from the evidence. 
If arguments that the willfully blind are as blameworthy as the 
knowing are correct—and by correct, I mean consistent with the 
 
 96. See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, 58–62. Husak and Callender would avoid the 
legality problems and answer the pragmatic demands for liability by expanding statutes to punish 
recklessness in some of these willful blindness scenarios. Id. While this proposal would work, there 
is no reason to expect that courts will hold off on applying the well-established willful blindness 
doctrine while awaiting legislative action on the matter, and little reason to expect legislative action 
itself. 
 97. Id. at 62. 
 98. For more on the uncertainty of knowledge as a condition, see Ira Robbins’ discussion of 
Karl Popper’s approach to the problem. Robbins, supra note 70, at 217–18. 
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societal norms that govern much of criminal law—then one would 
expect convictions for actual knowledge to be returned in many or 
most cases of willful blindness, simply as a matter of evidence. The 
jury would assess the evidence of willful blindness—evidence of 
actual awareness of a high probability coupled with an affirmative 
effort to avoid further knowledge—and from this infer knowledge. 
They would infer knowledge because this category of mens rea is as 
much a placeholder for a common-sense kind of culpability as it is an 
analytically cohesive mental state.99 
Williams’ hypothetical captures this mere evidence account of 
willful blindness.100 There is no flaw or error in building knowledge 
into a hypothetical about willful blindness; indeed, this is the point of 
willful blindness under the method of proof account. The hypothetical 
would be incomplete without this clarity. 
Willful blindness is a condition which, when proven, can support 
the conclusion that the defendant actually knew of the fact in 
question.101 To evaluate whether this claim is justified, however, it is 
important to consider the nature of knowledge at criminal law. 
IV.  THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT FITS WITH THE LAW’S SIMPLE 
AND MORALLY-LOADED APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE 
Much of the difficulty surrounding willful blindness can be traced 
to confusion between knowledge as a philosophical concept and 
knowledge as a legal instrument. While the question of when a person 
can be said to know X is famously difficult (or impossible) for 
philosophy,102 it is not and cannot be so for the law.103 The law 
introduces “knowledge” as a functional concept, relying on fact 
finders’ intuitions both about mental states and about justice. 
 
 99. For an instrumentalist account of substantive criminal law incorporating societal norms to 
maximize its own legitimacy, see Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the 
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840 
(2000). 
 100. It is not clear that this was Williams’ intent, as in other places his account of willful 
blindness more closely aligns with the substitute account. See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
CRIMINAL LAW 159 (2d ed. 1961) (“A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can 
almost be said that the defendant actually knew.” (emphasis added)). By introducing the possibility 
of allowing willful blindness to establish knowledge where it could only be said the defendant 
“almost knew,” Williams appears not to restrict willful blindness to a mere method of proof, but 
anticipates it serving as a substitute. 
 101. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011). 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Unger, A Defense of Skepticism, 80 PHIL. REV. 198, 198 (1971). 
 103. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 8. 
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Knowledge at criminal law is not an analytically pure concept; rather, 
it is an instrument of justice based on common intuitions, susceptible 
to change as normative intuitions about particular circumstances 
vary.104 To understand the particular function of the willful blindness 
doctrine, one must consider this distinction between knowledge as a 
philosophical concept and knowledge as an instrument of criminal 
law. 
Ira Robbins describes knowledge at criminal law as “an 
awareness of the existence of a particular fact or attendant 
circumstance.”105 From this, he concludes that “one ‘knows’ 
something only if he or she is certain of it.”106 This is probably too 
demanding a condition, as one struggles to conceive of certainty in a 
meaningful sense. An hour ago, I parked my car outside the building. 
I park here routinely and have no reason to believe my car has moved. 
I have not seen my car in that hour, but I believe my car is parked 
where I left it. I have a justified belief that my car remains where I left 
it. I cannot, however, say I have certainty about that belief; but most 
would conclude that, if my car remains where I parked it, I presently 
have knowledge as to its location. This objection, however, is minor 
and generally handled by reference to near certainty, a more realistic 
precondition for the state we call knowing.107 
Most philosophical accounts limit knowledge to justified true 
beliefs. The criminal law does not. At criminal law, knowledge serves 
a function of identifying a culpable mental state. While the 
instrumental knowledge of law is plainly related to the philosophical 
concept, the two are distinct. 
The Gettier problem—a classic challenge for philosophical 
accounts of knowledge—helps illustrate the differences between the 
philosophical and criminal law accounts of knowledge. Gettier posits 
that while justification, truth, and subjective belief may be necessary 
for actual knowledge, they are not sufficient.108 The proof stems from 
a series of hypotheticals in which one holds a particular belief about 
X, that is true and justified, but it turns out that the believer’s 
 
 104. “No single definition of knowledge is universally agreed upon or regularly employed, even 
within the limited context of criminal mens rea.” See Charlow, supra note 2. 
 105. Robbins, supra note 70, at 222. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1373. 
 108. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121, 121–23 
(1963). 
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justification is false while another justification, unknown to the 
believer, supports the truth of the proposition.109 
The use of knowledge in criminal law, however, is less 
epistemically pure and more instrumental. Knowledge at criminal law 
is a tool for identifying mens rea in the original sense: a guilty mind.110 
By limiting culpability to cases of knowing action, the law seeks to 
isolate a particular kind of culpability. Knowledge at criminal law is 
ultimately a tool to distinguish and target particular wrongful 
conduct.111 
Classic examples of the Gettier problem simply do not pose a 
challenge to the legal standard of knowledge; they would almost 
certainly be sufficient to establish knowledge for purposes of criminal 
liability, even as they confound philosophers. Suppose Omar hopes to 
steal narcotics from a drug trafficker. He is told by a law enforcement 
contact that a blonde woman with a turquoise headband and plaid 
pants on a particular train will be carrying a suitcase with narcotics. 
Omar boards the correct train, approaches a woman matching the 
description as she sleeps, steals her bag and flees. It turns out that her 
bag contained narcotics, but not because she was transporting it. Law 
enforcement was entirely wrong about her involvement in the drug 
trade; by whimsical chance her bag was mixed up with someone else’s 
when she sat for coffee before boarding the train. Her actual bag 
contained no narcotics, but the bag she came to possess of did contain 
narcotics. 
In this example, the Gettier problem suggests that Omar lacked 
actual knowledge that he possessed narcotics, even though he had a 
justified, true belief that he possessed narcotics. Omar’s belief 
happened to be true and justified, but the justification was 
unconnected to the truth of the proposition. He got lucky (so to speak). 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. “[T]he very same mental events can be knowledge or not knowledge depending on the 
moral valence of the actions to which they are relevant and the pragmatic context in which the 
action takes place.” James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal Law, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 497, 549 
(2016). 
 111. The conventional account of modern criminal mental states is that they are descriptive. 
James Macleod takes issue with this account, but acknowledges a descriptive component. 
Ultimately he concludes that while there are descriptive elements of mental states in most modern 
criminal codes, those descriptions are incomplete, relying on jurors employing evaluative concepts 
to make their ultimate conclusions. “[C]urrent instructions employ concepts like ‘knowledge’ and 
descriptions like ‘high probability’ that, on their most natural lay-interpretation, turn out to be both 
descriptive and evaluative.” Id. at 549–50. 
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There is little question, however, that Omar would be guilty of 
knowing possession of narcotics. The law cares about culpable 
mindset, not epistemic perfection.112 In this hypothetical, Omar did 
possess narcotics and he believed he possessed narcotics. It seems that, 
at criminal law, mere true belief may be sufficient for knowledge. 
Justification may drop out altogether. 
 A more difficult case for criminal law might be imagined as a 
further step away from the Gettier problem: the case of subjectively 
unjustified true beliefs. Suppose Jiminy honestly believes that there is 
marijuana in his trunk, because he wished upon a star that it would be 
so. As it turns out, and entirely apart from his celestial requests, the 
person who rented the car before him accidentally left marijuana in the 
trunk. In this case, Jiminy has a true and honest belief, but not one that 
is justified. Whereas Omar’s basis for his belief was sound but 
erroneous, Jiminy’s basis is unsound. Would the law care? Barring a 
mental illness or capacity defense,113 it seems not. Jiminy would be 
guilty of possessing marijuana with a true and honestly held, though 
unjustified, belief that he possessed marijuana.114 In reaching this 
same conclusion, Glanville Williams offered a less fanciful example: 
“[S]uppose that the accused is charged with receiving stolen property: 
when he received it, he thought it had been stolen by X from Y in 
January, but actually it was stolen by X from Z in February. Here there 
is the actus reus of receiving, and also the mens rea; it cannot be said 
that the accused had no knowledge of the theft merely because he was 
essentially right only by accident.”115 
 Recognizing knowledge as a gauge of culpability, distinct from 
the epistemic condition of the same name, simplifies the concept 
considerably. For purposes of criminal law, knowledge need not be 
justified. 
 
 112. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1374–75 (describing knowledge at criminal law as requiring 
only “belief, or subjective certainty, and the actual truth or existence of the thing known”). 
 113. These might be significant caveats. The criminal law evades much of the oddness of this 
example by mental capacity excuses and mitigation. That, however, does not directly affect the 
question of the nature of knowledge. Indeed, that limits on mental capacity can excuse otherwise 
knowing conduct fits well with my claim that knowledge at criminal law is best understood as a 
tool for gauging culpability. 
 114. See WILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 169 (“For legal purposes . . . to confine the word 
‘knowledge’ to cases of rigorous scientific proof, or even to cases where reasonable steps have 
been taken to verify the belief, would unduly restrict it.”). 
 115. Id. 
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This is not to say, however, that justification does not matter. 
Recognizing willful blindness as an evidentiary tool illustrates the 
powerful role justification can play in establishing knowledge for 
purposes of a criminal conviction. Namely, willful blindness allows 
the fact finder to infer subjective awareness from the proof of truth 
and justification. United States v. Jewell illustrates this approach.116 
Jewell drove a car with 110 pounds of marijuana into the United 
States, and was convicted of knowingly importing a controlled 
substance.117 That marijuana was in the car, “concealed in a secret 
compartment between the trunk and rear seat,”118 was undisputed.119 
That Jewell had some reason to believe he was transporting an illegal 
substance was also undisputed.120 The evidence thus suggests he 
would have been justified in actually believing there was marijuana121 
in the car. Accordingly, the evidence established justification to 
believe something true. The dispute hinged on Jewell’s subjective 
belief: he testified that he did not know there was marijuana in the 
trunk.122 The justification allowed the jury to reject this contention and 
to conclude that he was actually aware he was transporting a controlled 
substance. 
There are, however, two ways to describe this result. First, Jewell 
was punished for his willful blindness, distinct from actual knowledge, 
because his conduct was equally culpable.123 This is the substitute 
 
 116. See generally United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 117. Id. at 697–98. 
 118. Id. at 698. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 698–99. 
 121. Or some controlled substance; the law is clear that knowing possession does not require 
knowledge of the particular kind of controlled substance possessed. See McFadden v. United States, 
576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015) (“That knowledge requirement may be met by showing that the defendant 
knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it 
was.”). 
 122. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698. 
 123. The equal culpability of the defendant is generally recognized as the best justification for 
willful blindness as something more than a mere method of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 
640 F.3d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The rationale supporting the principle of ‘willful blindness’ is 
that intentional ignorance and actual knowledge are equally culpable under the law.”). Alexander 
Sarch relies on this justification to prescribe narrower limits for willful blindness instructions: 
“courts should not give willful ignorance instructions in just any case of willful ignorance (as many 
courts allow), but only when it is plausible that the defendant acted with a form of willful ignorance 
that rendered her conduct as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct.” See Alexander Sarch, 
Equal Culpability and the Scope of Willful Ignorance Doctrine, 22 LEGAL THEORY 276, 278 
(2016). Sarch’s argument anticipates the central problem with all substantive willful blindness 
models: it is punishment by analogy. 
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approach, accepted in Jewell by the Ninth Circuit,124 and today by all 
courts;125 this approach introduces the problems of punishment by 
analogy and judicial extension of substantive criminal law. 
Alternatively, Jewell could only be punished for knowingly 
importing a controlled substance, but the evidence about his 
justification for such alleged belief was deemed sufficient for the jury 
to infer actual belief.126 Then-Judge Kennedy urged this approach in 
his dissent.127 This alternative approach uses willful blindness only as 
a method of proof, and as such it is considerably less radical and 
problematic than the substitute approach. Barring the minority of cases 
involving confessions or contemporaneous documentation of a mental 
state, all contested mental states are proven indirectly;128 willful 
blindness is but a common form of indirect proof. 
V.  THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT IS SUPPORTED BY THE HISTORY 
OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE 
While the substitute account is now widely accepted, a mere 
evidence account aligns better with the historic origins of the doctrine. 
Those origins can be found in and around the navel yards of Britain. 
Regina v. Sleep129 is generally identified as the earliest case in 
which judges accepted the possibility that proof of willful blindness 
might satisfy a statutory requirement of knowledge.130 To appreciate 
 
 124. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698. 
 125. See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 
YALE L.J. 2231, 2232 (1993). 
 126. By actual belief, I am referring to Ira Robbins’ formulation of knowledge: “an awareness 
of the existence of a particular fact or attendant circumstance.” Robbins, supra note 70, at 222; see 
supra note 70 and accompanying text. This definition seems to me to be both simplistic from an 
analytic perspective and exactly correct from a legal perspective. The law, of necessity if not by 
design, simplifies complex questions of cognition. What is knowledge to a juror? It is whether the 
defendant was aware of something. Or, perhaps even more accurately, if more simplistically: it is 
whether the defendant knew it. In court, common sense and folk psychology generally prevail over 
philosophy of the mind and neuroscience. 
 127. Judge Kennedy dissented because the conviction was predicated on jury instructions that 
permitted the substitute approach. He nonetheless pointed out, correctly, that the evidence of willful 
blindness in the case would be sufficient to justify a conviction by a properly-instructed jury. See 
Jewell, 532 F.2d at 708 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“We do not question the sufficiency of the 
evidence in this case to support conviction by a properly-instructed jury.”). 
 128. Buell & Griffin, supra note 93, at 133, 153. 
 129. (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1296. 
 130. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 298 (1954) (“So 
far as can be discovered, the case of R. v. Sleep was the first occasion in which judicial approval 
was given to the notion that some lesser degree of knowledge than actual knowledge would be 
sufficient to establish mens rea.”); Justin C. From, Note, Avoiding Not-So-Harmless Errors: The 
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the origins of this doctrine, however, it is worth examining the case 
and the context in which it arose. 
In Sleep, the jury convicted the defendant of knowingly 
possessing copper belonging to the government.131 Specifically, he 
delivered to a ship a cask marked for delivery to one “Richard Pascoe, 
Helston, Cornwall,” and when police searched the cask they 
discovered 324 pounds of copper bolts in 150 pieces.132 Most of the 
bolts had been melted down and reformed, but a significant fraction 
retained the mark of a broad arrow,133 indicating the material was 
property of the British government.134 
As its empire expanded and its valuable government property 
spread more widely, the British government faced the problem of 
loss.135 The government needed to distribute materials, military and 
administrative, across a widening empire.136 The scope of the 
enterprise made keeping track of everything increasingly difficult. The 
significance of the problem was such that it gave rise to new forms of 
policing.137 
People were taking England’s stuff. That necessitated police, and 
it required keeping track of property. A pile of copper bolts could be 
grabbed, pounded, melted, packed, and moved to a new location; the 
 
Appropriate Standards for Appellate Review of Willful-Blindness Jury Instructions, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 275, 282 (2011) (“The willful-blindness doctrine first appeared in the English courts in 
1861.”); Marcus, supra note 125, at 2233 (noting that “[w]illful blindness first appeared as a 
substitute for actual knowledge in English case law over a century ago” in Regina v. Sleep); 
Robbins, supra note 70, at 196; see also Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 192 (2011) (“Willful blindness, known at the time as connivance, first 
surfaced in the mid-nineteenth century in England.”). 
 131. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1297. 
 132. Id. at 1296. 
 133. Id. at 1297. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private 
Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 121–22 (2017) (“In 1797, thefts of cargo from boats on the 
Thames led a small group of distinguished citizens, including celebrated jurist Jeremy Bentham, to 
approach the West India Planters Committee and the West India Merchants Committees 
associations with a proposal to create a private police force. With the permission of the government, 
the Thames Police—officially the West India Merchants Company Marine Police Institute—began 
operations the next year. Parliament passed the appropriately titled Act for the More Effectual 
Prevention of Depredations on the River Thames to support England’s first preventative police 
force. The Thames Police did not last long, but it sparked a broader interest in private efforts to 
supplement the watch system. ‘By 1829[,] London had become a patchwork of public and private 
police forces.’ A contemporary record reflects private police units operating in forty-five different 
parishes within ten miles of London.” (alteration in original)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
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government lost and no one would be held accountable. The broad 
arrow represented an important advance in inventory management, 
and one that could be used to punish those who interfered with the 
Crown’s property, while deterring others who might do so.138 
Enter Mr. Sleep with over 300 pounds of copper probably 
belonging to the British government, and the law began to develop. In 
Regina v. Sleep, the court found itself confronting the difficulty of 
proving knowledge.139 
Knowledge began to appear in British anti-piracy statutes in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, originally as an 
alternative to wittingly or willfully.140 Introducing a mental state as a 
condition of guilt created a significant challenge of proof. As Queen’s 
Counsel argued, “[i]f it were necessary for the prosecution to prove 
knowledge, there would be great difficulty in obtaining a conviction. 
It was the meaning of the legislature that the onus of excusing the 
possession should be thrown on the prisoner.”141 
Earlier courts had accepted exactly this argument. For example, 
in refusing to import a mens rea requirement to a statute forbidding 
possessing a game on a common carrier: “If it were necessary to aver 
that the defendant had actual knowledge it would cast on the prosec-
utor a burden of proof which could not easily be satisfied . . . .”142 
In Regina v. Sleep, however, the court rejected the argument, 
noting that every statute includes a mens rea element unless mens rea 
is expressly excluded.143 Still, the court addressed the issue as one of 
proof: possessing material marked with a broad arrow may create a 
presumption that the possessor knows the item is government 
property, but the presumption can be rebutted and was in this case by 
 
 138. See Broad Arrow, 1 JOHNSON’S UNIVERSAL CYCLOPAEDIA 599 (rev. ed. 1888) (“Broad 
Arrow, the British government mark placed upon all solid materials used in ships or dockyards, to 
prevent embezzlement of royal stores. The origin of the mark is obscure. Before 1698 the 
authorities prosecuted a dealer in marine-stores for having in his possession certain stores bearing 
the broad arrow of his majesty. The defendant, when asked what he had to say, replied that it was 
very curious that the king and he should both have the same private mark on their property. The 
man was acquitted, and this led to the passing of a law that persons in possessions of stores or goods 
of any kind marked with the broad arrow, shall forfeit all such goods, with £200 and costs.”). 
 139. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1296. 
 140. 8 J. LL. J. EDWARDS, MENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENSES 55 (1955). 
 141. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1300. 
 142. The King v. Marsh (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 550. 
 143. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1300. 
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the defendant’s statement—accepted by the jury—that he was 
unaware of the markings.144 
Willful blindness comes up only at the end of the case, where two 
justices comment on it as a viable alternative to more direct proof. 
First, Justice Crompton posited that it would be “a crime for an 
unauthorized person to have these stores in his possession, because the 
sight of the broad arrow should put him upon inquiry, and so 
knowledge that they are marked is essential.”145 Yet he immediately 
then noted that this rule “would not apply where the prisoner’s eyes 
are wilfully and deliberately shut to the truth.”146 Justice Willes 
agreed, explaining that “[t]he jury have not found, either that the man 
knew that the stores were marked, or that he wilfully abstained from 
acquiring that knowledge.”147 
The generally accepted historic account of willful blindness then 
leaps fourteen years forward, to cases in which courts affirmed 
convictions based on willful blindness.148 To see the evidentiary 
origins of willful blindness, however, it is worth looking back from 
Regina v. Sleep where the doctrine was first described. The roots of 
the doctrine can be traced to the development of the law of theft from 
the very narrow common law crime of larceny to the broader category 
of wrongful takings. 
Theft at common law was limited to larceny, the unlawful taking 
of property; it did not include the unlawful deprivation of property 
lawfully taken.149 Thus, one who absconded with the property of 
another without permission and with intent to deprive the owner of 
possession was guilty of larceny, but one who unlawfully retained 
 
 144. Id. at 1301 (“[I]t is a fair presumption, where a man is found in possession of marked 
articles, that he knew them to be marked; but that presumption may be rebutted by the 
circumstances of the case. Here it is manifest, if the prisoner’s statement is to be believed, that he 
was ignorant of the fact that the copper was marked; and the ordinary presumption is rebutted.”). 
 145. Id. at 1301–02. 
 146. Id. at 1302. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Edwards, supra note 130, at 299–300 (first describing Bosley v. Davies (1875) 1 Q.B. 
84 (Eng.); then Redgate v. Haynes (1876) 1 Q.B. 89 (Eng.)). 
 149. Michael Tigar traces this ancient distinction back to early Roman Law distinguishing 
between the manifest thief, caught in the act of taking, and the non-manifest thief, caught merely 
in unlawful possession of another’s property. Killing a manifest thief was justifiable homicide, 
while the penalty for a non-manifest thief was capped at two-fold restitution. Michael E. Tigar, The 
Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1446–47 (1984); see also FLETCHER, 
supra note 73, at 31 n.9 (discussing the Ancient Roman statutory distinction between a thief caught 
in the act and one that was not caught in the act). 
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possession of property lawfully possessed was not guilty of larceny.150 
Moreover, for some time this latter example was simply not a crime, 
leaving a gap in the common law (at least as viewed from the modern 
perspective).151 
The actus reus of larceny was in the taking; absent coincidence of 
taking with intent to wrongfully deprive, there could be no larceny.152 
This rule changed dramatically over time. “At the risk of some 
oversimplification we could say that the essential difference between 
the traditional and modern approaches is that the former was oriented 
toward the actus reus, while the latter is oriented toward the mens 
rea.”153 Whereas traditionally only the taking was punished, now the 
intent to deprive is punished. 
This shift to hinging guilt on the defendant’s mental state carried 
obvious evidentiary challenges.154 If the difference between larceny 
and non-criminal wrongful possession turns on when, by whom, and 
under what circumstances an item was acquired, the methods of proof 
are relatively simple. However, “it is impossible to prove the state of 
another man’s mind with the result that the defendant’s knowledge is 
generally inferred from the nature of the act done.”155 Shifting to 
questions of mental states clouds the evidentiary picture 
considerably.156 
The statutes at issue in broad arrow cases reflect an effort to 
balance the need to criminalize wrongful takings of widespread 
military supplies against the challenges of proving mens rea. The 
 
 150. See Tigar, supra note 149, at 1445–46. 
 151. George Fletcher suggests that this modern perspective, with its exponentially expansive 
approach to substantive criminal law, has lost the “distinction between a public sphere of criminal 
conduct and a private sphere subject at most to regulation by the rules of private law.” George P. 
Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1976). 
 152. So a conviction for wrongful possession of a horse, absent proof of intent to deprive the 
owner of the horse at the time it was hired, could not stand. See The King v. Pear (1779) 168 Eng. 
Rep. 208. 
 153. Fletcher, supra 151, at 502. Tigar observed a different shift: from protecting possession to 
protecting ownership. Tigar, supra note 149, at 1455–56 (“The importance of possession was de-
emphasized, while that of ownership—dominium—was elevated.”). 
 154. See Fletcher, supra 151, at 525–27. 
 155. EDWARDS, supra note 140, at 191. 
 156. See Fletcher, supra 151, at 525 (“When there is no close evidentiary link between the act 
and the proscribed intent, the prosecution is forced to rely on the prospects of securing a confession 
or testimony of the defendant’s incriminating admissions. When these forms of evidence are 
unavailable, proof of the defendant’s unmanifested intent is likely to turn on even more 
questionable forms of evidence.”). 
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statute at issue in Regina v. Sleep is plain that its purpose is simplify 
the proof required to convict for theft of government property.157 
As the law was broadened to permit conviction not only for taking 
“in the mainour,” but also for being found in possession, mens rea 
assumed newfound significance. After all, if a person was found in 
possession of goods rightfully belonging to another, his culpability 
would depend entirely on his mindset. Had he bought them, or 
innocently found them after another left them there, he might have no 
culpability at all. This might also be true of one actually taking goods 
from their rightful owner—i.e., under circumstances where he did not 
know they belonged to another he would lack culpability—but these 
circumstances are both rarer and more difficult to claim when caught 
directly in the act of taking. Accordingly, mens rea gained new 
importance as the substantive law of theft broadened beyond common 
law larceny. 
The proof component, nonetheless, loomed large. How to prove 
a person’s mental state? Absent confession or contemporaneous 
documentation, it can be done only circumstantially.158 This left plenty 
of room for the defendant to falsify a story to counteract the 
circumstantial evidence of mens rea.159 These evidence challenges 
gave rise to willful blindness, originally conceived as connivance.160 
Connivance, from the Latin connivere, meaning “to close the 
eyes,” or to pretend ignorance,161 can be traced back further than even 
willful blindness. Connivance was an element of the anti-bribery 
statute forbidding any payment to or agreement with a naval, customs, 
or excise official to “conceal or connive at” the breaking of 
Parliamentary law.162 
 
 157. Regina v. Sleep (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1296, 1298 n.(a)1 (“Whereas notwithstanding divers 
good laws made and enacted for the preventing of the stealing and imbezlement of his Majesty’s 
stores of war and naval stores, those frauds, thefts, and imbezlements are frequently practised, and 
the convicting of such offenders is rendered difficult and impracticable by reason it rarely happens 
that direct proof can be made of such offender’s immediate taking, imbezling or carrying away any 
of his Majesty’s said stores . . . .”). 
 158. EDWARDS, supra note 140, at 191. 
 159. See id. at 194. 
 160. Id. at 193–94. 
 161. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1364 n.57. 
 162. The King v. Hymen (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1118–19 (“This was an information by 
the Attorney-General against the defendant for penalty of 500l. under the statute 24 Geo. 3, st. 2, 
c. 47, s. 32, which enacts that ‘If any person shall give offer or promise to give any bribe, 
recompence or reward to, or make any collusive agreement with any officer of the Navy, Customs 
or Excise, to do, conceal or connive at any Act whereby any of the provisions made by this, or any 
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This use of connivance, however, is entirely distinct from the 
substitution of connivance, or willful blindness, for knowledge. For, 
the agreement itself would satisfy actual knowledge on the part of the 
official, even if he were merely conniving about the specific incident 
that violated the law. So, for example, a merchant might bribe a 
customs official to ignore his shipments for a few days in order to 
avoid duties owed. The official accepting such a bribe is knowingly 
accepting payment to allow the laws under his authority to be broken 
even if he is merely blind to the specific items moved and duties 
unpaid. 
The same cannot be said of the person who acquires property 
marked with a broad arrow, who recognizes the risk that it is so 
marked, but who remained intentionally unaware of that fact. In this 
hypothetical—like Regina v. Sleep—the defendant lacks knowledge of 
the marking. What remains at issue is whether he lacks knowledge that 
the material is government property. If he remains unaware of the 
marking because he suspects it is government material, hopes to profit 
from wrongfully possessing government material, and intentionally 
avoids learning more to avoid culpability,163 a jury may conclude he 
knew it was government property. This is the evidentiary use of willful 
blindness. 
VI.  THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT GENERATES SIMILAR OUTCOMES 
The legality problems generated by willful blindness ought to be 
sufficient to inspire a change. Change, however, would be more 
palatable if it gelled with popular intuitions that the willfully blind are, 
sometimes, equally culpable as the knowing. The fewer outcomes that 
change by reconceptualizing willful blindness as mere evidence, the 
fewer objections to the shift. Willful blindness has gained widespread 
acceptance for a reason: it aligns with people’s sense of justice. Any 
 
other Act of Parliament relative to His Majesty’s Customs or Excise may be evaded or broken, 
every such person shall for each offence (whether the same offer, proposal, promise or agreement 
be accepted or performed or not) forfeit the sum of 500l.’”). 
 163. Robin Charlow’s willful blindness test is similar, but importantly different. Charlow 
would allow willful blindness to substitute for knowledge where a person: “(1) is aware of very 
good information indicating that the fact exists; (2) almost believes the fact exists; and (3) 
deliberately avoids learning whether the fact exists (4) with a conscious purpose to avoid the 
criminal liability that would result if he or she actually knew the fact.” Charlow, supra note 2, at 
1429. The critical difference, however, is that Charlow is still advocating for a substitute account 
of willful blindness, not an evidentiary account. 
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proposal that deviates too far from that is unlikely to be adopted by 
courts.164 
Many of the conclusions predicated on claims of willful blindness 
could just as well be described as knowledge.165 And, by describing 
the mental state as knowledge—limiting willful blindness to mere, but 
potentially significant, evidence of knowledge—courts would avoid 
the serious problems posed by the substitute account.166 The results 
would generally be the same, and the collateral harm to core principals 
of legality would be significantly reduced. 
Some outcomes would change. Husak and Callender describe the 
three-suitcase hypothetical in which a foreigner approaches three 
American tourists boarding return flights home.167 He offers to pay 
each of them an unusually high fee if they each carry one suitcase back 
to the States.168 He also assures them that two of the three suitcases 
are empty and he will not tell them what is in the third.169 It is, of 
course, a reasonable conclusion that one of the three contains 
contraband. Indeed, were the hypothetical to involve but one suitcase, 
the hypothesis of the instant article is that on these facts a jury could 
rightly convict for knowing transport of contraband.170 But with three 
suitcases, no one of the three tourists could be said to be aware she 
was carrying contraband.171 To the contrary, more likely than not, each 
tourist is not carrying contraband.172 
Husak and Callender use this hypothetical to argue that willful 
blindness that does not require awareness of even a high probability 
of the fact in question.173 The authors’ goal is to describe willful 
blindness in the manner most true to its purpose: to attach guilt to those 
 
 164. See Robinson, supra note 99, at 1861 (“The criminal law cares about layperson’s intuitions 
of justice because their incorporation is essential to normative crime control.”). 
 165. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1360. 
 166. See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 48–49. 
 167. See id. at 37–38 (this is the authors’ modification of a previously posited two-suitcase 
hypothetical: “Suppose that the example is altered to involve three tourists, two of whose suitcases 
were known to be empty.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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cases that present “the moral equivalent of knowledge.”174 By the 
three-suitcase hypothetical, the authors suggest that “[t]he agent’s 
estimation of the probability of the truth of a proposition does not seem 
to be essential to judgments about whether he is wilfully ignorant.”175 
This seems right if we accept that willful blindness ought to be 
defined in alignment with the purpose of attaching guilt to cases that 
present the moral equivalent of knowledge. Why is the person any less 
blameworthy for accepting unusually high fees to knowingly engage 
in conduct that has a 33 percent chance of being illegal than one who 
does the same with a certainty of its illegality? The former is in a more 
enviable position—it is likely she is getting paid for doing something 
that poses no risk; but she’s demonstrated the same lack of respect for 
the law as the person who engaged in the known misconduct.176 As 
Husak and Callender conclude, however, that purpose is so plainly at 
odds with legality principles—brashly introducing punishment by 
analogy as an acceptable function—that it ought to be rejected 
outright.177 
A jury ought not convict a person of knowingly transporting 
contraband if it concludes, based on the circumstantial evidence, that 
she actually believed there was only a one in three chance she was 
transporting contraband. Is her moral culpability meaningfully 
different than someone like Jewell, who actually believed there was a 
90 percent chance he was carrying contraband? Probably not. Under 
the hypothetical, the one-in-three tourist (1) has a warranted suspicion 
there is contraband in one of the suitcases, (2) could easily confirm 
whether or not hers contains contraband, and (3) is motivated not to 
confirm the truth by hopes of preserving a defense.178 These, more 
than her degree of certainty, point to the moral equivalence of 
knowledge. On the moral equivalence standard, she would be willfully 
ignorant and thus guilty. 
 
 174. See id. at 36–39; see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 
(2011) (“The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are 
just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”). 
 175. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 39. 
 176. Id. 
 177. “Using the equal culpability thesis to justify punishing the wilfully ignorant defendant 
under a statute requiring that he act knowingly is to employ the very kind of analogical reasoning 
condemned by the principle of legality.” Id. at 56. 
 178. See id. at 40–41. 
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This, however, is not the standard adopted by courts, nor should 
it be.179 Courts generally still require awareness of a high probability 
of the fact in question.180 Each tourist in the three-suitcase 
hypothetical ought to be acquitted, moral equivalence 
notwithstanding. Because, moral equivalence is not a valid basis on 
which to impose criminal liability.181 
So, some instances of morally equivalence must be acquitted; 
still, some significant number of willfully blind defendants could still 
be convicted. 
In most cases, the (sincere) wilfully ignorant defendant 
would admit that he believes p, but would deny that he knows 
p. On the assumption that knowledge consists of some kind 
of externally justified true belief, this denial can only be 
interpreted as an allegation that the quantum of justification 
possessed by the willfully ignorant defendant is insufficient 
to give rise to knowledge.182 
Were knowledge at criminal law coextensive with the 
philosophical concept, this would be a compelling defense. 
But put it to a jury. Let the jury assess whether the defendant with 
justified awareness of a high probability that a fact is true, who could 
have easily confirmed that fact, but who did not because he sought to 
avoid “guilty” knowledge, knew that fact or not. I would suggest more 
often than not, with these conditions satisfied, the jury will find the 
 
 179. Sarch concludes otherwise, positing a duty to reasonably inform oneself before acting and 
advocating for criminal liability for breach of the duty. SARCH, supra note 8, at 112. The instant 
Article urges a simple remedy to a problematic doctrine that is likely to marginally contract the 
scope of liability from the status quo. Fulsome consideration of Sarch’s duty-based doctrine is well 
beyond the scope of my thesis. That said, I must admit real concern about the implications of an 
approach that expands criminal exposure in this manner, for communal functioning, business 
cultures, and the economy. That said, and in fairness to the proposal, it may be that there is a way 
to mitigate these concerns by limiting which “substantial and unjustified risks” give rise to a duty 
that could trigger criminal liability. 
 180. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1382 n.141. 
 181. The clarity of the three-suitcase hypothetical simultaneously obscures the question of 
whether expanding liability to mere risk cases is prudent. In real life, there are no three-suitcase 
scenarios. And there are no (or few) risks understood with anything like mathematical precision. 
There is known bad conduct. Conduct that is probably bad. Conduct that seems a bit hinky. Conduct 
that probably generates some risks but the engineer believes those risks are justified by anticipated 
benefits. A criminal code ought to provide clarity. It should be minimalistic. The consequences for 
criminal violations are severe, and people in an open society cannot be subject to the prospect of 
criminal sanctions every time they miscalculate, or differentially calculate, risks and benefits. 
 182. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 46–47 (emphasis omitted). 
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defendant guilty, not for being willfully blind, but rather for actually 
knowing.183 
Remember the hypothetical about an investor with concerns 
about an unreasonably high agency fee in Saudi Arabia?184 I think she 
knew the money would be used for bribes. Of course, it depends what 
the meaning of know is, but we’ve been through that. Maybe you 
agree, maybe you don’t. But put it to a jury, and I expect she would be 
convicted. She knew enough to ask about the fee. She received an 
absurdly unhelpful answer. What else could she possibly have thought 
but that she was investing in a venture that would function in part 
through paying bribes? That’s enough for a juror to conclude she 
actually knew.185 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted this view in the 
seminal case, United States v. Jewell.186 “[I]n common understanding 
one ‘knows’ facts of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act 
‘knowingly,’ therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive 
knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability 
of the existence of the fact in question.”187 This is quite correct. It 
reflects the common view about knowledge that juries are likely to 
employ in any event.188 And, it is the reason that a shift to 
conceptualizing willful blindness as but a form of evidence of 
knowledge—as opposed to a substitute for knowledge—would have 
only a limited impact on the outcomes of real-world cases. Generally, 
cases presenting difficult questions of willful blindness are cases in 
which juries are likely to conclude that the defendant had 
knowledge—as they understand that term. 
Courts have consistently rejected defense arguments that it is 
error to instruct a jury as to willful blindness where there is evidence 
from which the jury could find actual knowledge.189 “[A]ssuming 
there to be sufficient evidence as to both theories, it is not inconsistent 
for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and actual 
 
 183. “Often this evidence will be enough to conclude that the defendant knows p, even if he 
has not considered all the evidence that honest people would ordinarily consider.” Id. at 50. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 185. Assuming, as courts do sometimes instruct, that the jury did not conclude the defendant 
had an affirmative belief that bribes would not be paid. 
 186. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 187. Id. at 700. 
 188. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 53. 
 189. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353–54 n.7. 
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knowledge.”190 Were willful blindness conceptualized as a method of 
proving knowledge, rather than a substitute for knowledge, this rule 
would be as obvious as it would be unnecessary. A jury could find 
knowledge based on any kind of circumstantial evidence, and 
evidence that the defendant was actually aware of a high probability 
of the material fact and deliberately sought to avoid confirming that 
probability could be accepted by a jury in making the cognitive leap 
from objective facts about the world to the subjective state of the 
defendant at some earlier time.191 
And very often one would expect the jury to make precisely this 
leap. Consider the case of Sandra Wert-Ruiz, convicted of conspiracy 
to launder drug money through her money remitting business.192 On 
appeal, Wert-Ruiz contended it was error to instruct on willful 
blindness, because the only evidence was of actual knowledge.193 She 
argued that “each piece of the government’s evidence can be 
interpreted in only one of two ways: either she was a knowing 
participant in the conspiracy (if the government’s evidence is 
believed) or she was an unknowing innocent who became ensnared in 
it (if the government’s evidence is not believed).”194 
This binary division between knowing and not knowing ought to 
be the standard approach to any case where the relevant statute 
requires knowledge for a conviction. The introduction of a grey area—
a not-quite-knowing-but-just-as-reprehensible kind of ignorance—is 
the original sin of the substitute account. Eliminating this third 
category between knowing and not knowing, however, would not 
eliminate the facts upon which it is predicated. In Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s 
case, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude she had 
knowledge of the source of the moneys she remitted: the use of coded 
language, the elimination of a zero when discussing denominations, 
the creation of false receipts.195 
In defending the provision of a willful blindness instruction, the 
appellate court referred to Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s own statements as 
evidence from which a jury might conclude she was merely willfully 
 
 190. United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 191. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1360. 
 192. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 252. 
 193. Id. at 256. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 254. 
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blind.196 When asked by an investigating agent whether she “thought 
the money came from the sale of narcotics, ‘[Wert-Ruiz] replied that 
she was an educated woman, and where else would money come from 
in that amount.’”197 The court then describes this critical evidence as 
follows: 
This statement, if credited by the jury, would indeed suggest 
actual knowledge and not willful blindness. Still, in 
juxtaposition with Wert-Ruiz’s claims at trial not to have 
known the source of the funds, it could arguably be viewed 
as an example of willful blindness—in other words, she 
never asked questions while participating in the conspiracy, 
but when the truth was revealed she was not at all surprised 
about what really had happened.198 
Query: what is the difference between these possibilities? Perhaps 
there is a difference of degree. An educated woman receiving large 
quantities of cash in gym bags for remittance, from people who spoke 
in code and consistently described numbers as one-tenth their actual 
value, would certainly suspect that she was receiving proceeds from 
an illegal activity. But more than that, might we not conclude that she 
actually knew this fact? On the other hand, there are plenty of facts we 
would conclude she did not know. Who sold drugs to whom? There is 
no reason to believe she would or could have known the details of 
individual transactions. But that is immaterial: money laundering 
requires only knowledge “that the property involved in a financial 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful 
activity.”199 Indeed, the government need not even prove that she was 
aware that the money was from the illegal sale of narcotics; awareness 
that the money was derived from “some form of unlawful activity” 
would be sufficient.200 
So, how to describe Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s mental state regarding the 
source of moneys? She must have had at a minimum strong suspicion 
that the money stemmed from an illegal activity. It might have been 
any number of illegal activities: fraud, extortion, embezzlement, or the 
sale of non-narcotic contraband like certain firearms or child 
 
 196. Id. at 257. 
 197. Id. (alteration in original). 
 198. Id. 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2011). 
 200. See id. 
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pornography. These, however, are significantly less likely, if only 
because each represents a smaller, more rarified market with fewer 
proceeds than the drug dealing. So, Ms. Wert-Ruiz would have 
significant suspicion that this was money from an illegal activity, 
probably drug dealing. Really, we—or more consequentially, a jury—
might describe her as Glanville Williams described the employer who 
knew his business was being run in an illegal way but avoided learning 
the details.201 We can call this condition willful blindness—as did 
Williams202—but we are simply describing a form of knowledge. The 
evidence—some of which might look like willful blindness—was 
sufficient for the jury to conclude that Ms. Wert-Ruiz was actually 
aware the money she was remitting was derived from illegal 
activity.203 There is really no need for anything more. 
Defendants frequently appeal convictions where willful blindness 
instructions were given on the basis that there was insufficient 
evidence to merit the willful blindness instruction.204 Courts generally 
rule that “[a]s long as separate and distinct evidence supports a 
defendant’s deliberate avoidance of knowledge and the possibility 
exists that the jury does not credit the evidence of direct knowledge, a 
willful blindness instruction may be appropriate.”205 This rule is 
predicated on the substitute account of willful blindness, and as 
formulated, it clarifies how flawed that account is. 
Here again we see that epistemic confusion undergirds most 
courts’ descriptions of willful blindness. What is “evidence of direct 
knowledge?” Or, perhaps more simply, what is direct knowledge? 
There is no such thing. Knowledge, at law, is the subjective awareness 
of a sufficiently high probability—maybe a near certainty—that a 
particular fact does or will be true.206 When Bob pulls the trigger on a 
loaded gun aimed at William’s head, barring facts allowing for an 
alternate explanation, we will readily conclude that Bob was 
subjectively aware he was about to cause William’s death or serious 
bodily harm. Perhaps the First Circuit is using the phrase “direct 
knowledge” to refer to subjective awareness of facts predicated on the 
defendant’s own senses. Used this way, one could say that Mr. Jewell 
 
 201. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 202. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 125. 
 203. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 257. 
 204. See United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 92–93 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 205. Id. at 93. 
 206. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1373. 
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lacked direct knowledge of the 110 pounds of marijuana in his trunk, 
because he never saw it with his own eyes. 
This, however, introduces a curious—if understandable—
segmentation and prioritization of justifications. “I saw it with my own 
eyes,” is as flawed a justification as it is popular. Our own eye—our 
sensory perceptions—are not necessarily the best justification for 
beliefs. Senses can be mistaken; senses can be tricked. Direct 
knowledge—if by that the court means knowledge justified by 
reliance on one’s own sensory perception—is not uniformly better 
than indirect knowledge (i.e., knowledge justified by reasonable 
deductions or inferences from other known facts). 
The phrase, “evidence of direct knowledge,” whether 
intentionally or not, suggests a different phrase: direct evidence of 
knowledge. Of course, this is what is always and necessarily lacking 
when the law seeks information about a person’s subjective mental 
state at an earlier time.207 There is only indirect, circumstantial 
evidence of knowledge.208 Some circumstantial evidence of 
knowledge is relatively direct: for example, a clear video showing Mr. 
Jewell open the trunk, look at over 100 pounds of marijuana, and 
hurriedly close the trunk. Some circumstantial evidence of knowledge 
is less direct: for example, accepting large bags of cash for remittance 
from people who speak in code. But to be clear, neither case involves 
direct evidence; there is and could be no such thing when referring to 
past mental states.209 Inferences are required even in the Jewell-video 
hypothetical: that he saw the marijuana; that he understood it to be 
narcotics; that his vision and brain were functioning normally at the 
time. 
On this spectrum between certain knowledge and certain 
recklessness, with only circumstantial evidence to rely on, many 
willful blindness cases could just as easily be knowledge cases in 
which willful blindness serves as the relevant circumstantial evidence. 
That is, convictions secured through the substitute of willful blindness 
generally could be secured through a mere evidence approach. 
 
 207. Id. at 1359. 
 208. Id. at 1359–60. 
 209. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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The case of United States v. Anthony210 is instructive. The 
defendant mounted a Cheek211 defense to allegations of tax evasion, 
contending that his good faith belief that he had no duty to pay taxes 
negated the required element of a “voluntary, intentional violation of 
a known legal duty.”212 On appeal he argued in part that the court erred 
by instructing on willful blindness because there was no independent 
evidence of willful blindness (as opposed to actual knowledge).213 The 
First Circuit rejected this argument noting that the defendant presented 
evidence of personally researching old Supreme Court cases and tax 
codes, but conceded on cross examination that he had not read new 
Supreme Court cases or the current tax code and regulations.214 
“Based on this, the jury could reasonably infer that, even if Anthony’s 
claim that he did not know of his duty was credible, his lack of 
knowledge depended on his deliberate refusal to extend his research 
to more current, authoritative sources.”215 That is one way to describe 
the defendant’s mental state. Another would be that he knew—as 
much as anyone ever knows anything—that he had a duty to pay taxes, 
and he conducted selective research to rebut this position. How could 
a jury conclude that he knew of his duty? The same way they ever 
make conclusions about mental states. The defendant’s credibility, the 
reasonableness of his claimed belief,216 the explanation for his claimed 
belief—these would help the jury conclude what a defendant truly 
believed at some past point in time about his duty to pay taxes or about 
whether there were drugs in the trunk. 
Adding willful blindness as a substitute does not—and ought 
not—significantly expand the scope of criminal conduct. But it will 
expand it somewhat, as demonstrated by the three-suitcase 
hypothetical. On a substitute approach bounded only by moral 
equivalence, the defendant would be guilty; on a mere evidence 
 
 210. 545 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 211. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1991). 
 212. Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64 (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200). 
 213. Id. at 65. 
 214. Id. at 66. 
 215. Id. 
 216. The Supreme Court held in Cheek that reasonableness is not necessary for a good faith 
defense against a claim of a willful violation, however, reasonableness plays a significant and 
recognized role in such cases. “Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or 
misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple 
disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government 
has carried its burden of proving knowledge.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203–04. 
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approach, the jury may conclude he lacked knowledge of the contents 
and acquit him. 
Today, the three-suitcase hypothetical is no longer really about 
suitcases; today, it is more likely to be considered in relation to 
corporate misconduct. The relative dearth of prosecutions of 
individuals following high-profile cases of corporate malfeasance has 
led to scholarly,217 judicial,218 and political219 criticism, as well as to 
policy shifts.220 The nature of the corporate hierarchy renders 
individual corporate prosecutions difficult and thus relatively rare.221 
Basically, most corporate crimes are crimes of knowledge, and higher 
level executives frequently lack actual knowledge of the specific actus 
reus.222 Willful blindness is thus a critical tool in white collar 
prosecutions,223 and a tempting hook for those who would expand 
criminal liability throughout corporate organizations.224 
Full inquiry into this topic is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, it is worth first acknowledging that a potential weakness of 
the mere evidence account of willful blindness is that it is restrictive, 
rather than expansive.225 If the goal of studying willful blindness is to 
capture more conduct within the bounds of criminality, the substitute 
account will serve that goal and the mere evidence account will not.   
 
 217. See generally MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE 
CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 1 (2017); David 
M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1277 (2016). 
 218. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 
 219. John Lanchester, After the Fall, LONDON REV. BOOKS (July 5, 2018), https://www.lrb. 
co.uk/v40/n13/john-lanchester/after-the-fall. 
 220. See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/76903
6/download. 
 221. See Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 361. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Famously, Frederick Bourke was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act based on a government theory that when the wealthy designer of handbags invested 
in the oil venture of another businessman, he was willfully blind to the likelihood that illegal bribes 
would be paid. United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372, 385, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 
667 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Second Circuit has held that conscious avoidance may satisfy 
the knowledge component of the intent to participate in the conspiracy.”). 
 224. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 231. 
 225. For reasons I have argued elsewhere, see generally Gilchrist, supra note 12. I believe this 
is more likely a benefit. See also Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that “[o]ne can 
reason and reflect upon all one’s available evidence in the most scrupulous possible fashion and 
still lack knowledge”). 
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My contention is that in the mine run of cases, the mere evidence 
approach is likely to generate the same outcome as the substitute 
approach. But not all cases. So, the three-suitcase hypothetical, and 
maybe more to the point, a twenty-three-suitcases hypothetical, may 
be resolved with guilty verdicts under a substitute-equal-culpability 
account and by acquittals under the mere evidence account. Plainly, 
this will affect corporate criminal prosecutions, where higher level 
executives frequently have only awareness of risks, rather than 
knowledge.226 
Second, having acknowledged this potential weakness, I would 
argue it is not a weakness at all. It is a limitation of the power of law. 
The law frequently fails to reach popular or even desirable results; 
that, itself, however, is no reason to alter the result.227 
VII.  THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT CANNOT COMPLETELY 
RESOLVE CONCERNS ABOUT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The first two evils associated with the substitute account of 
willful blindness—judicial usurpation of legislative function228 and 
punishment by analogy229—would be eliminated by the mere evidence 
approach. However, the third evil associated with willful blindness—
allowing conviction for knowing violations based on mere 
recklessness230—would only be curtailed to a lesser degree, if at all. 
This objection is fundamentally about the risk of wrongful 
conviction, and it has less to do with willful blindness—whether as 
evidence or a substitute account—than it does with the inherent 
imprecision of the legal definition of knowledge. 
As described above, the law’s conception of knowledge is 
importantly different, more simplistic, and more morally contingent 
than that aspired to by philosophy. To some degree, this stems from 
the necessary concession that knowledge of a future event or result can 
 
 226. Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 382. 
 227. It may be, however, a reason to alter the law. Indeed, for those who would use willful 
blindness to expand criminal accountability within the corporate hierarchy, statutorily amending 
the relevant codes to punish certain kinds of risk-taking is worth exploring. For more, see Peter J. 
Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 50 (2014) (exploring 
“possible approaches to adopting a statute that would permit federal prosecutors to pursue cases 
against corporate executives for their managerial decisions—decisions that result in significant 
economic harms, like those seen in the 2008 financial crisis”); SARCH, supra note 8, at 231. 
 228. See supra Part II.A. 
 229. See supra Part II.A. 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
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only be awareness that the event or result is practically certain to 
occur.231 There is no certainty. Bob points a loaded gun at William’s 
head and pulls the trigger. Should William be killed by the gunshot, a 
jury will no doubt conclude that Bob knowingly caused William’s 
death. But Bob, upon pulling the trigger, could have possessed 
certainty as to that outcome only through ignorance. He may or may 
not have been cognizant at the time of the alternative results, but they 
included at a minimum that the gun would jam, that the bullet would 
miss, and that the bullet would hit its target but inflict less-than-
expected damage. Allowing awareness of these contingencies would 
render knowing crimes impossible—it would eliminate the category 
altogether. Accordingly, awareness of a practically certain result is 
sufficient for knowledge.232 Permitting knowledge with 
contingencies, however, renders knowledge a question of risk—like 
recklessness. 
Acting with awareness of a substantial and unjustified risk that a 
particular result might occur is merely reckless.233 The line between 
knowledge and recklessness, therefore, is only one of degree admitting 
of limited precision. When Bob points a gun a William’s head and 
pulls the trigger, the chance of William’s death is great enough that 
the jury is comfortable assigning knowledge of this result to Bob. Yet, 
when Sally agrees to drive drunk, only to hit and kill Amy as a result 
of her intoxication, no jury will find this a knowing killing. Sally was 
aware of a substantial and unjustified risk of death to another by her 
driving while intoxicated; she acted anyway and caused a death. This 
is textbook recklessness, and the jury will have little difficulty 
discerning it from knowledge. 
Between these poles, however, lie necessarily harder cases. The 
tavern owner who collects triple revenue on Thursday nights, who 
knows his bartender has a history of running illegal games, who makes 
a point of taking Thursdays off. The man who accepts an unusual fee 
to drive a car across a border, no questions asked. The woman who 
remits bags of cash in a legitimate business established to move money 
between countries. These are the willful blindness cases, and they are 
 
 231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“The inference of ‘knowledge’ 
of an existing fact is usually drawn from proof of notice of high probability of its existence, unless 
the defendant establishes an honest, contrary belief.”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. § 2.02. 
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difficult whether willful blindness remains a substitute for knowledge 
or whether it is reconceptualized as a form of evidence from which 
one might infer knowledge. In either event, there is a chance juries 
will get it “wrong.”234 Because the line between knowledge and 
recklessness is one of degree, there is always the chance that a jury 
will find knowledge where a more accurate account would identify 
mere recklessness. This risk stems not from willful blindness, but from 
the imprecise delineation between the category of knowledge and that 
of recklessness, and from the impossibility of an error-free system. 
Moreover, limiting the categories represented on the spectrum 
between plain knowledge and plain recklessness might actually 
mitigate the problem. Instructing a jury that they must find knowledge 
or willful blindness, as happens with a substitute account of willful 
blindness, generates a heuristic of three categories along what is truly 
a fluid spectrum.235 First, knowledge, followed by willful blindness, 
followed by recklessness. This model may generate more convictions 
than a binary knowledge/recklessness model if only because it asks 
the trier of fact to imagine three segments of the spectrum, and 
designates two of them as sufficient for conviction. 
Of course, this need not be true; there is nothing inherent in a 
greater raw number of convictable categories that will necessarily 
expand the scope of liability; however, the greater number of 
categories sufficient for guilt is unlikely to decrease the number of 
convictions and may, as a simple matter of confirmation bias, lead to 
more convictions. That is, as many critics have suggested, it may lead 
jurors to assign guilty knowledge to what—absent the willful 
blindness substitute category—would otherwise be mere 
recklessness.236 
In any event, while it is not clear that the mere evidence approach 
adequately responds to the wrongful conviction/mere recklessness 
objection, it at least does not aggravate the problem. 
 
 234. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 76 (1999) (“[E]rrors cannot be entirely eliminated from the process of 
criminal adjudication and that mistakes will inevitably occur.”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
525 (1958) (“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which 
both parties must take into account.”). 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 236. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1355–56. 
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CONCLUSION 
Does theory matter? Many ask whether legal scholarship is too 
concerned with castles in the sky while practitioners toil in the dirt. 
The premise is unfair in both directions.237 Lawyers must embrace 
theory if they are to craft fulsome and compelling arguments; scholars 
must embrace practical implications if they are to earn an audience. 
The theory of willful blindness serves as an exemplar of just how 
important theory is, and how intertwined with practice it must be. 
The dominant account of willful blindness offered by courts is 
deeply problematic. However, it is clear. Willful blindness is an 
acceptable substitute for knowledge because those who act in a 
willfully blind manner are equally culpable as those who act 
knowingly. Willful blindness is therefore an acceptable substitute for 
knowledge. 
To describe the account is to recognize its deeply flawed nature. 
Courts lack authority to legislate alternative categories of crime, and 
to do so by way of moral analogies evidences a complete disregard for 
rule of law. This theoretical problem threatens the perceived 
legitimacy of the legal system; and yet it is so easy to avoid. A 
conceptual shift, from a theory of substitution to a theory of evidence, 
avoids the legality problems entirely. And, the shift would likely 
change relatively few outcomes. 
The history and theory of the willful blindness doctrine fit with 
the mere evidence account. The mere evidence account avoids the 
legality pitfalls. And, the mere evidence account works in the sense 
that it generates similar outcomes. When it comes to willful blindness, 
the practice is not particularly problematic, but the theory is. That 










 237. See Heather K. Gerken, Resisting the Theory/Practice Divide: Why the “Theory School” 
Is Ambitious About Practice, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 135 (2019). 
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